9/18/10

A Kind of Revolution (excerpt 1)

Note: This is an excerpt from the fifth chapter of Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States of America: 1492-Present 

In Federalist Paper #10, James Madison argues that representative government was needed to maintain peace in a society ridden by factional disputes. The disputes came from “the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society,” The problem, he said, was how to control the factional struggles that came from inequalities in wealth. Minority factions could be controlled, he said, by the principle that decisions would be by vote of the majority.

So the real problem, according to Madison, was a majority faction and here the solution was offered by the Constitution, to have “an extensive republic,” that is, a large nation ranging over thirteen states, for then “it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other… The influence of factions leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”

Madison’s argument can be seen as a sensible argument for having a government which can maintain peace and avoid continuous disorder. But is it the aim of government simply to maintain order, as a referee, between two equally matched fighters? Or is it that government has some special interest in maintaining a certain kind of order, a certain distribution of power and wealth, a distribution in which government officials are not neutral referees but participants? In that case, the disorder they might worry about is the disorder of popular rebellion against those monopolizing the society’s wealth. This interpretation makes sense when one looks at the economic interests the social backgrounds of the makers of the Constitution. 

As part of his argument for a large republic to keep the peace, James Madison tells quiet clearly, in Federalist #10, whose peace he wants to keep. “A rage for paper money, for abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it.”

When economic interests is seen behind the political clauses of the Constitution, then the document becomes not simply the work of wise men trying to establish a decent and orderly society, but the work of certain groups trying to maintain their privileges, while giving just enough rights and liberties to enough people to ensure popular support.



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